As a benchmark it's useful to review the DC-X1 program: its goals, how it was run, and what it accomplished. First and foremost the DC-X1 program was always an experimental technology program, with never an intent to build an operational SSTO system. The focus from day one was on building a flight demonstrator that would rapidly advance our understanding of a host of key technologies and operations. Although various government laboratories and organizations participated in the program, a single program manager made all key decisions in an office that never contained more than two military officers. This centralized decision making structure was key to controlling costs and delivering the $60 million DC-X1 vehicle -- a cost 4 to 5 times less than predicted by standard Air Force and NASA costing models. Moreover, a relationship was established with the prime contractor based on mutual trust. The government did not micro-manage the contractor. At the same time the contractor made sure the government was an active member of the development team, and understood the risks inherent in the experimental program. Accepting some risk to dramatically reduce costs should be the norm for an experimental vehicle.The most important issue answered by the DC-X1 was the ability to service and re-fly a reusable rocket without the standing armies used at Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg AFB. The "aircraft-like" operating mode of the DC-X1 required only 7 technicians to turn the vehicle around between flights, and 3 crew members to fly the vehicle at its flight control center. The DC-X1 was actually serviced and static fired twice in one day, then flight tested 3 times in 6 weeks before the program ran out of money.
Combining this kind of operation with light weight composite airframes allows SSTO vehicles to be operated with the efficiency of modern aircraft -- thus providing private enterprises the opportunity to procure and operate the next generation of SSTO vehicles. Once SSTO is flight proven using experimental rockets and a "fly-before-buy" acquisition strategy, the actual operational built by private enterprise would be able to save most of the $8 billion the U.S. now spends annually on space launch. Moreover they can open a host of new commercial markets such as those illustrated by Bill Gates' proposed 840 "Teledesic" satellites (!), and ranging from suborbital transports to new launch vehicles. However, the government's job must be limited to developing the technology and encouraging commercialization; let private industry capitalize on these government investments.
To keep NASA or the Air Force from turning SSTO into another jobs program Congressional intent and goals need to be clearly laid out "up front." This office believes that the fundamental goals any such SSTO program should pursue should include: Enabling private enterprise to build and operate efficient next generation SSTO vehicles. Military spin-off vehicles may also be required early in the next century. Keeping the focus on building and flying competitive suborbital and/or orbital experimental rockets within approximately 3 years from the present. There is no Congressional interest in allowing SSTO to devolve into an expensive follow-on to the Space Shuttle. Using the DoD management team (where possible) or at least the same management philosophy that was demonstrated so successfully on the DC-X1 program. Channeling the vast majority of appropriated funds into "X"-rockets versus ground based demonstrations which, although lower in risk, are also less effective at rapidly maturing technologies. Ensuring that American industry designs, fabricates and flight tests the X-rockets, not government laboratories or flight test centers.
In addition to the top level goals addressed above, any Government SSTO initiative needs to be managed like the DC-X1 program; i.e., with a small staff and limited funds. Key management objectives ought to include: Establishing a single manager tasked and empowered to execute the program. Ensuring no more than 6 government employees are in the Government's program office. Keeping the program focused on flying one or more low cost X-rockets (don't let it degrade into nothing more than a ground technology initiative for government labs). Ensuring that the flight demonstrator is tested in central CONUS so that it addresses up front the overflight and reliability issues critical to future commercial and military needs. Optimizing the SSTO design around commercial requirements versus, heavy lift Titan IV or Space Station needs. Keep the initial designs small, not big. Demonstrating the capability to operate SSTO vehicles with only tens of people and minimal annual costs, like large commercial aircraft.
NASA's strong current interest in SSTO is an important step that has helped legitimize the viability of SSTO vehicles. But NASA's cost estimates for both a technology program and follow-on acquisition program are much larger than corresponding DoD and industry estimates. NASA's cost estimates for a technology program are 2 to 3 times more than DoD's due to NASA's desire to reduce risk with a much more extensive ground technology program prior to building and flying a X-rocket. Although some risk reduction may be warranted, NASA must also recognize that a major purpose of experimental vehicles is to dramatically lower overall costs by accepting prudent risks in flight testing.
The NASA "Access to Space" study recently estimated costs for a future SSTO acquisition program at 3 to 4 times more than corresponding DoD estimates. NASA personnel are quick to point out their estimates were a first rough cut and were based on a heavy lift Shuttle replacement vehicle as well as a "Business As Usual" acquisition philosophy; i.e., "Shuttle II." Clearly this is not acceptable for an affordable program and contributes to Administration and Congressional concerns about initiating a major new pork program. These concerns are legitimate and we must work closely with NASA to keep the program streamlined and efficient -- experimental technology demonstrations only. If the private sector can't build and operate SSTO vehicles after the government demonstrates key technologies then we shouldn't pursue the program.
The best way to keep SSTO from becoming another pork program is to keep funding low enough to preclude anything but experimental flight vehicles, and to ensure that DoD maintains a stake in SSTO technology demonstrations. DoD's needs center around smaller payloads (medium lift or less) which is also consistent with all of today's commercial needs. The SX-2, proposed as a competitive follow-on to the DC-X1, both demonstrates all critical SSTO technologies and serves as an early prototype of a reusable first stage which can deploy small satellites with an upper stage. The small size of this proposed vehicle helps keep the cost affordable. The DoD's success with the DC-X1 and other experimental programs over the years is a good model on which to build NASA and DoD SSTO initiatives. Both NASA and DoD must work closely together in a true partnership, both to ensure each agency maintains its equity in the future and to ensure uneeded duplication isn't tolerated.
Much can still go wrong, and Congress must not rest on its laurels regarding the drive for privatized SSTO vehicles. Instead, Congress must lay down groundrules and ensure that NASA and DoD have clear direction and funding for implementing complementary technology demonstrations. If either agency violates the groundrules laid down in this Memorandum, Congress would want to use the power of the purse to bring NASA and DoD under control.